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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DR. ANATOLY KORYAGIN AND ALEXANDER SHATRAVKA
ON THE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE U.S.S.R.

MAY 15, 1987

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PUBLIC HEARING: DR. ANATOLY KORYAGIN AND ALEXANDER SHATRAVKA ON THE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE U.S.S.R.

FRIDAY, MAY 15, 1987

COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 1302, Longworth House Office Building, at 10 a.m., Representative Steny H. Hoyer, chairman, presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners and Senators Harry Reid and John Heinz.

Also in attendance: Samuel G. Wise, staff director, Jane S. Fisher, senior staff consultant, Catherine Cosman, Judy Ingram, Ron McNamara and Leonard Steinhorn, staff assistants.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HOYER

Chairman HOYER. I am going to convene the hearing. We are going to have a slight change in the order of witnesses. The reason for that is Dr. Koryagin just got here this morning and as a result, he is working with Cathy Cosman of our staff with respect to the translation. She will be effectively reading Dr. Koryagin's statement, which has been prepared obviously in Russian. So, we are going to start this hearing with an individual who has had a significant relationship with Dr. Koryagin, which he will explain, Mr. Shatravka.

I want to welcome Senator Reid, one of our new members, to the Commission from the Senate, but an individual who as a Member of the House had a very significant interest in human rights issues, and has just recently been handily elected to the U.S. Senate, and has been added as a member of the Commission.

We are very pleased to have him as a member of the Commission.

I want to welcome him and our distinguished witnesses to this very special hearing today. I especially want to welcome, of course, Dr. Koryagin. We are deeply relieved that you have been given your freedom, and we share your sadness that the cause for which you have sacrificed so much remains unchanged.

In the next 2 hours we will hear a great deal about Soviet human rights abuses, especially the gruesome practice of punishing dissidents through psychiatric torture. But our hearing has another focus today, and I call it courage.

Moral courage is a rare quality in this world, indeed. Some have called it the true secret of liberty. With it we fight injustice and despair. Without it we have no recourse from fear and tyranny.

The great writer Emile Zola could not bear silence in the face of injustice and said, "My duty is to speak; I have no wish to be an accomplice."

Dr. Anatoly Koryagin, with us today, also could not be silent. He refused to close his eyes to injustice, and for his crime of telling the truth, he spent 6 grueling years in a Soviet prison. He was imprisoned because he spoke out against the way a medical science, meant to open the mind, was being used to close it. He was imprisoned because of his courage, because of his commitment, because of his integrity.

It was wrong he said to commit sane people to institutions for the insane, and administer them crippling and debilitating drugs. He showed the world in clinical detail how a government abused psychiatry to silence, demoralized and discard its political opponents.

Because of the courage of men and women like Dr. Koryagin, we now know the truth, that there are hundreds, if not thousands of political prisoners confined to Soviet psychiatric hospitals. They are there for any number of reasons, trying to emigrate, joining an independent trade union, religious activism, or simply writing complaints to their government.

In the United States, these actions are protected by our Bill of Rights, but in the Soviet Union they are considered crimes worthy of psychiatric incarceration. Among the nations of this world the Soviet Union stands alone in its widespread use of psychiatry as a tool of political repression.

Appearing with Dr. Koryagin, as I said earlier, is Alexander Shatravka, a peace activist who was twice incarcerated in psychiatric prisons and labor camps. Soviet leaders can talk of peace and win world renown, Soviet citizens like Alexander Shatravka talk of peace and are imprisoned.

When Dr. Koryagin went public and said that some people were put in psychiatric prisons because of their political beliefs, not because of the status of their mind, it was based on his diagnosis of Mr. Shatravka.

We are pleased to have him with us. The Commission, indeed, is honored to have both Dr. Koryagin and Mr. Shatravka here with us. We look forward to your words of insight, we already respect your courage.

And, as I said earlier, we will start in reverse order.

Prior to doing that, however, I would like to recognize Senator Reid for any statement that he might want to make.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRY REID FROM NEVADA

Mr. REID. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much participating in this hearing. I certainly commend you for holding the hearings. I have looked forward to these hearings for a number of reasons. We, here in America, I want both of you to know, have had a lot of stars, we have athletic heros, and we have movie stars. But I can honestly say that you both fit into that category.

And I have very much looked forward to today to be able to come here and to listen to a couple of real stars, real heros.

I have read, of course, résumés of both and they are impressive, and I look forward very much to the testimony that will be given today.

Chairman HOYER. We are going to have Senator Reid move over a little bit, so we can hear him, apparently they are not picking it up outside.

Let me at the outset say that we have three interpreters with us, first of all, Cathy Cosman, of our staff, a long-term member of the staff of the Helsinki Commission, who will be interpreting for Dr. Koryagin.

We also have Katherine Fitzpatrick of the Helsinki Watch Committee, who will do the English interpretation for Mr. Shatravka. And we have Victor Davidoff of the Center for Democracy who will interpret questions into Russian for our witnesses.

The Helsinki Commission would like to thank our interpreters, and also Ellen Mercer of the American Psychiatric Association for her assistance during Dr. Koryagin's visit to the United States.

Also, preliminarily, I would like to recognize the 11th Moscow Helsinki Group anniversary. As many of you know, this week the Moscow Helsinki Group should have marked its 11th anniversary, if Soviet repression had not taken its toll. The working commission on psychiatric abuse for which Dr. Koryagin was a consultant, was affiliated with the Moscow Helsinki Group.

The Helsinki Commission would like to take this opportunity to express its admiration for the brave men and women who form the unofficial Soviet Helsinki movement. One such brave woman, Lyudmilla Alexeyeva of the Moscow Helsinki Group, is with us today. We wish her and all other Soviet Helsinki monitors, including Moscow Helsinki monitors Ivan Kovalov and Tatayna Osipova who arrived in our country just a few days ago, all the best in their future endeavors.

The Helsinki human rights work these courageous people began in the Soviet Union is continuing, thanks to their efforts and sacrifice the Helsinki process has been strengthened. We must remind the Soviet Government that it must release the remaining imprisoned Soviet Helsinki monitors before it can hope to gain credibility in the Helsinki process.

I would also like to recognize and welcome to the Commission hearings Mrs. Koryagin, who is here with us today. I understand she hasn't been feeling well and we certainly hope she is feeling better.

Again, before proceeding, I would now like to recognize another Member of the U.S. Senate, a long-term member of this Commission, and a long-term leader on behalf of the rights of individuals all over the world and in this country, as well, Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania.

Senator.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN HEINZ FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Senator HEINZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief, because I do want to hear from Dr. Koryagin and Mr. Shatravka as quickly as possible.

I will be traveling to the Soviet Union next week, I will be leaving here Thursday, and the purpose, in part of my visit will be to try and determine why there are still 183 citizens of the Soviet Union being held in psychiatric hospitals, in spite of all of the rhetoric we get about the improvements in the treatment of dissidents.

I intend to try and find out why there are still some 650 known, identified political prisoners that are still being held. We only know about 110 that have been released. I am anxious to know whether the Soviets intend, after they review the emigration cases they have indicated they will review, whether they will return to the very strict interpretation under their new laws, that might well shut new emigration down to an all-time low level.

And I want to find out why they have not released any of the some 300 religious political dissidents, and whether or not they have any belief that freedom of conscience, which is in their Constitution, is a principle by which they have any intention of standing.

And I think that the subject that we focus on today is of particular importance, and I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Senator.

At this time, again, I want to introduce Alexander Shatravka. If we have him here long enough all of us will become perhaps comfortable with pronouncing his last name. People have a tough time with Steny as well.

Alexander Shatravka was born in 1950, in the city of Krivoi Rog, in the Ukraine. In 1968, as a student in the Merchant Marine School, he was motivated by his critical attitude to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, to object to the military draft. For this he was forcibly hospitalized in a mental hospital, and after being released was put under strict KGB surveillance.

In 1974, however, Alexander escaped KGB control and, joined by his younger brother and two friends, crossed the Soviet-Finnish border illegally. They were seized by Finnish border guards and, as with so many other Soviet defectors to Finland—were returned to the hands of Soviet authorities. For 5 years Alexander and his brother were incarcerated in various psychiatric prisons in the Soviet Union. Shatravka described his prison experience in a book, "If You Are Obsessed with Freedom," which he wrote in 1980 and smuggled out of the U.S.S.R.

Since the organization of The Group for Establishment of Trust Between the United States and the U.S.S.R., known as the Trust Group, in May 1982, Alexander Shatravka has taken an active part in the independent peace movement in the Soviet Union. He was one of the first to sign the program document of the Trust Group, which is entitled Appeal to the Governments and Publics of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. It said, and I quote:

We are convinced that the time has come for the public not only to confront decision-makers with the issue of disarmament, but also to participate in the decision-making process with the politicians.

We are in favor of a four-sided dialogue—for dialogue in which the average Soviet and American citizens are included on an equal footing with political figures.

Alexander's activities in assembling signatures under the Appeal led to his second arrest on July 15, 1982 in the Siberian city of Tiumen. Together with the peace activist, Vladimir Mishchenko, he was charged with the "dissemination of slander against the Soviet and social system," parenthetically a charge so easy for the Soviets to make, so difficult to disprove, and so fraudulent in its impact on the Helsinki Final Act promises made by the Soviet Union.

The Tiumen Regional Court found both guilty in April 1983, and sentenced Alexander to 3 years in labor camp.

While in the labor camps, Alexander was regularly beaten and punished with solitary confinement in freezing-cold cells. In December 1984, Alexander Shatravka was re-sentenced to another 2½-year term for the totally fabricated charges of illegal possession of drugs.

A broad campaign in his defense from abroad brought some improvement in the situation. Pressure on the Soviet officials, including the Soviet cochairman of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Dr. Chazov, led to the sudden release of Alexander from labor camp on June 23, 1986. A few days later, notwithstanding the Soviet assertion made to so many of us who have had the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union, that we hear repeatedly, that those who desire peace in the Soviet Union are given full freedom to express that, notwithstanding that, Mr. Shatravka was thrown out of the Soviet Union.

The Commission is very pleased and honored to have a man of conviction and of courage, such as Mr. Shatravka with it today. We welcome his testimony.

Thank you very much.

Ms. FITZPATRICK. Thank you very much. I am going to read an English translation of his Russian testimony, in order to save time.

STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER SHATRAVKA

Mr. SHATRAVKA. As a political prisoner, I was forced to spend a total of 9 years in various ordinary and special psychiatric hospitals, as well as labor camps in the U.S.S.R., for my dissent. I was the last patient to be examined independently and declared sane by Dr. Anatoly Koryagin, as part of his work in the Working Commission to Investigate the Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes.

I attended the Astrakhan Naval Academy and worked as a sailor and fisherman. I first came into conflict with the authorities as a young man when I refused to cut my hair and be subject to the compulsory draft. I repeatedly attempted to obtain permission to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. because I did not want to cooperate with the system, but I was refused.

In 1973, I was called up into the army in my hometown, Krivoy Rog, in the Ukraine. I refused to perform military service and was incarcerated in Igren Regional Psychiatric Hospital and administered sulfadiazine and other strong medication. I was released as

an outpatient within 2 months after I had been questioned about my intentions to go abroad.

In 1974, my brother and I and two friends attempted to escape from the U.S.S.R. via Finland. We had agreed that in the event of capture, we would attempt to be put in psychiatric detention which we thought would be a milder form of punishment than labor camp.

We were picked up inside Finland by the border guards, after we were forced to stop our flight when one of us was injured. The Finnish authorities returned us to Soviet custody, and both my brother and I were sent to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and diagnosed as suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia" because of an "exaggerated value for life in the West."

We were subsequently transferred to Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital and subjected to heavy doses of various neuroleptics, including aminazine and chlorprothixene. In 1976, I was moved to Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital where there was a large group of political prisoners. But after the activist Leonid Plyushch was released and sent to the West—Plyushch had been one of the prisoners in Chernyakhovsk—he was able to campaign about the abuse of psychiatry and publicize the cases he knew.

The authorities then decided to split up the group of politicals and send them to other hospitals, in order to distract the West's attention from the very harsh conditions there. I ended up back in Igren, where I was not "treated," and then Geikovka, where I was given trisedil, a form of medication.

In March 1979, I was finally discharged with the diagnosis of schizophrenia and registered as an outpatient. I continued to wish to get out of the U.S.S.R. somehow, and decided that as a kind of insurance against psychiatric detention, I would send my manuscript about my experiences to the West. I hoped that my book, which was entitled "If You Are Delirious With Freedom or Report from the Belly of the Cannibal," would prove my sanity and prevent the Serbsky Institute from diagnosing me as mentally ill.

I then worked for a number of seasons in the Siberian forestry works and was periodically harassed by the KGB. In early 1981, I traveled to Kharkov to meet Dr. Koryagin and spent several days being examined by him. I was arrested while returning from his home and put in a psypsychiatric hospital for 1½ months because the KGB was trying to put "unreliable elements" behind bars during the 16th Party Congress that February.

I later learned that Dr. Koryagin himself was arrested shortly after me.

In the summer of 1982, I was arrested in my forestry camp for distributing an independent peace appeal, the founding document of an unofficial peace group called the Moscow Group to Establish Trust Between United States and the U.S.S.R. I was once again sent to the Serbsky Institute for examination and was seen by the very same professors who had determined in 1974 that I suffered from "exaggerated value for life in the West." This time I told the professors that both Dr. Koryagin and another psychiatrist, Dr. Voloshanovich, had seen me independently and had found me sane.

The Soviet professors responded that Dr. Koryagin had only done this to "discredit Soviet psychiatry," and had been sentenced for this "offense." But they then proceeded to find me sane and accountable for my actions.

Professor Yakov Lazarevich Landau, Professor Margarita Feliksovna Taltse, and Dr. Fokin were forced to declare me a mentally healthy person, thus confirming the accuracy of the psychiatric examination conducted by Dr. Koryagin, and vindicating his charge of wrongful detention of dissenters for political reasons. I believe they were forced to change their diagnosis because by that time my case, and the issue of psychiatric abuse, had become well known in the West and concerned people had protested my plight.

After I was pronounced fit to stand trial, I was sentenced to 3 years labor camp in 1982, for "anti-Soviet slander" for appealing to peace activists abroad "over the heads of the party," which allegedly discredited the Soviet Union's professed peace policies.

I was subsequently re-sentenced in labor camp to an additional 2½ years. But I was released in June 1986, before the end of my term, after campaigns by Western peace and human rights organizations on my behalf. Prior to releasing me from custody, the authorities moved me to Alma Ata Special Psychiatric Hospital in May of 1986. Frankly, I was glad to escape the heavy labor and intrigues of the KGB and camp administration for a month.

The authorities kept trying to get me to renounce my views, and to appear with a recantation before the press. Finally in July 1986, I was permitted to leave the Soviet Union and settle in the United States.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much. Before we begin questioning I would like to ask Dr. Koryagin and Ms. Cosman to come up to the table. While they are doing so, let me reiterate, perhaps, a biography that no one needs, because Dr. Koryagin's courage and conviction is well known, but let me briefly give his biography.

Dr. Koryagin, who is 48 years of age, graduated from the Krasnoyarsk Medical Institute, and in 1972, received his doctorate in psychiatry from the Research Institute for Neurology and Psychiatry in Kharkov. After working as a psychiatrist in Abakan and Kyzyl, in 1973, he became a consultant to the Kharkov Regional Psychiatric Clinic.

It was in 1979, that Koryagin became involved in human rights activities with the unofficial Working Commission on the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes. He examined 17 former psychiatric patients, hospitalized for their political opinions, and found them to be mentally sound.

Koryagin's public criticism of Soviet psychiatry for its abuse of sane political prisoners in the Soviet Union had major international impact. He was arrested on February 13, 1981, and later sentenced to a 12-year term of imprisonment for, again, and I quote, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Koryagin's fate ensured the expulsion of the U.S.S.R. from the World Psychiatric Association. To avoid this humiliation, the Soviets resigned from the WPA in January 1983, the first time ever that the Soviet Union has had to leave an international body for failure to respect its rules.

At his trial Koryagin said, and I quote,

I am waging my struggle for the rights of political prisoners, for their human dignity, for their lives and health, and against the threat of punishment and provocations. I have been standing firm and will continue to do so,

he said,

let everyone know that, I bow to those who are fighting for me."

In the Gulag, Koryagin was subjected to especially harrowing conditions. During his 6-year term of imprisonment, Koryagin spent 3 years in solitary confinement, a total of 2 years on hunger strikes, being force-fed intravenously, and 6 months in the punishment isolation cell, getting food only every other day. In reprisal, Koryagin was re-tried in January 1986, his sentence was extended by 2 years for, and I quote again, "resisting representatives of authority."

Mrs. Koryagin, who only saw her husband twice in 6 years, described him after a 6-month fast in 1983 as looking like, and I quote her, "a starving bag of water."

After his release from camp on February 20, 1987, Dr. Koryagin said, and I quote,

Once freed, I have not, to my regret, noticed any essential shift in the Soviet people's way of life, no matter what the official propaganda organs say about the "democratisation" of the country. I see the same almighty power of the KGB and the Ministry of Interior over ordinary people, who, in turn, remain without a voice, without rights and indifferent to everything emanating "from on high".

In an unprecedented move, TASS, the Soviet news agency, announced that Dr. Koryagin and his family were granted exist visas on April 23. The Koryagin family currently resides in Switzerland. Dr. Koryagin, who is a member of the American Psychiatric Association, addressed its annual meeting in Chicago on May 13, just 2 days ago.

A candidate for this year's Nobel Peace Prize, Dr. Koryagin was first nominated for that honor by the congressional members of the Helsinki Commission in 1986.

It is, indeed, Doctor, an honor for us and for our country, and for those who adhere and are committed to the principles enunciated in the Helsinki Final Act to have you with us here today.

Dr. Koryagin.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANATOLY KORYAGIN

Ms. COSMAN. Dr. Koryagin will read the first paragraph in Russian, and then I will summarize the rest of the testimony in English. The entire written version of his testimony will be available in the hearing record. And I also wanted to mention to members of the press and public who are interested, I will translate the text in full, and it will be available from the Commission office next week.

Chairman HOYER. Without objection, Dr. Koryagin's statement in full will be included in the record at this time. And for those in the press who did not hear, the full translated text will be available as early as is possible to get a translated version ready, hopefully by no later than Tuesday of next week.

Testimony of Dr. Anatoly Koryagin
at a Public Hearing
of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
on
May 15, 1987

The Helsinki process was planned as a long term political strategy, worked out by the participating governments. The participating states accepted this strategy in order to lower the level of military danger in the world on the basis of improved relations and greater mutual trust. What can one say about this, in what is now already the 12th year of this agreement?

As a representative of a humane profession, I am most interested in any political phenomenon in how it affects the ordinary person. Since I have lived all this time in the Soviet Union I can speak only about those life realities with which I came into immediate contact in this country which has also signed the Helsinki Final Act. And so: What did the Soviet citizen get from the Helsinki accords?

It very soon became clear, that the Soviet government is far from ascribing equal importance to the basic parts of the agreement. A brazenly dishonest tactic was adopted in the (Soviet) approach to the issue of security and disarmament in relation to its negotiating partners A task was set: To use the effect of the alluring strength of the Helsinki idea on Western consciousness to achieve military superiority over the West. Continuing feverishly to build up its arms, the Soviet Union simultaneously laid out for the whole world a well organized propaganda campaign of the struggle "for peace and disarmament." The calculation was simple: in the Soviet Union, no one can control the military sector except the government itself, while in Western democratic countries this control is exercised by the entire population with the help of the press and the private organizations. And this is what happened. The Soviet people, languishing under an unbearable military burden, seeking comfort with the aphorism of Soviet propaganda, "as long as there is no war," turned out for subbotniks (ed.: Saturdays of "voluntary" labor) and contributed their wages to the "Peace Fund," while citizens in Europe and America were on the streets of their cities demanding that their governments to stop arming and to start disarming. Any Western government must expend efforts to get armament plans of one kind or another through parliament, but in the U.S.S.R. the "parliament" only approves of Politburo decisions by a show of hands. In this way it is not surprising that by the 1980's the balance of armaments has tilted in favor of the Soviet Union to such a degree that it allowed itself to occupy Afghanistan.

The tempo of the growth of armaments from the day that the Helsinki Final Act was signed has not only not slowed down, it has increased. Proportionally, people's fear of war has also grown. Soviet propaganda, consciously exploiting the human instinct of self preservation, has tried as hard as it can to exaggerate this fear in the popular consciousness in order to direct their behavior in the needed direction: for Soviet citizens to come to terms with their lack of rights and to force them to work even harder for their government to save their lives; to induce free people in the West to doubt the stability of the world around them, to sow uncertainty in their minds about tomorrow, leading to a re-evaluation of established values; to induce escapism and other psychological conditions, leading to destablization of societal moral foundations. Now, in my opinion, one can say that Soviet propaganda has achieved some success in this direction. And in this the Helsinki Final Act has played by no means the smallest role as a method of speculation.

On the issue of economic cooperation, the Soviet Union made improvement of its economic situation by using the Western economy one of its Helsinki goals. It is difficult for me to judge what the West has gained from economic contacts with the U.S.S.R., but there can be no doubt that the U.S.S.R. has gained from them. That is why the Soviet government is always trying to broaden these contacts at any price. When one speaks about any economic gain for the U.S.S.R., one should keep in mind that in every specific case this gain will be put to the use of the government apparatus, not for the benefit of the ordinary person, since in this country the human being was always seen as the property of the state and was obliged to exist only for utilitarian purposes. In Soviet leadership plans, the human being was always seen as a means, not an end. In this way, for the ordinary Soviet working man Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act "does not give anything, other than greater tension at work due to the application of technology in production."

Cooperation in the sphere of humanitarian questions in the Helsinki framework was for the Soviet Union an undesirable basket which it was obliged to sign in order to get the first two. As the entire course of events showed, the Soviet government did not intend to observe the provisions of this basket.

The groups which arose in the country to foster the observance of the Helsinki agreement were seen as a challenge from the uncontrollable Soviet public. Not fearing any kind of sanctions from its Helsinki partners, the authorities took reprisal on the members of these groups, putting them behind

bars. But in the country, more and more people appeared who said that they took seriously the Soviet signature on the Helsinki Final Act and who would not come to terms with their country's violations of its obligations. Alarmed at the prospect of a major sweep of a movement to promote the observance of civil rights in their country, the authorities began a real political-terror-by-trial of dissidents, which continued, without let up, until 1987. People were thrown into political and criminal concentration camps on hastily trumped-up charges, taking reprisal behind people's backs, locking them up in psychiatric hospitals. Organized in response to psychiatric persecution, the "Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Aims" was destroyed, in 1980-1981 all its members ended up behind bars. I was the consulting doctor for this commission and for that I received a seven-year camp and five-year exile sentence. From there, in the man-eating gullet of the GULAG, for the first time I really examined and got to the essence of the Soviet legal system.

First of all, the Soviet citizen is deprived of the right to be him or her self. He or she cannot express aloud opinions or views which differ from those which are officially propagated. Any attempt to make use of this right ends up in imprisonment.

In the concentration camp or prison the Soviet citizen is not only deprived of rights, but usually, of health and even of life. Prisoners of conscience undergo particular ordeals, as the KGB tries to break them and force them to renounce their beliefs at any price and by any method.

Even the law itself establishes limits for prisoners' rights and on forced labor in imprisonment. In addition, the law limits for the prisoner the possibilities of satisfying elementary physiological needs. Under the conditions (regulated by law!) of forms of punishment such as solitary confinement and punishment isolation the prisoner is forced to survive torture which often leads to dystrophy and to illnesses. Prisoners have died in concentration camps (I. Mrktchyan, V. Stus.) Soviet law directly denies people of the possibility of eating, insofar as it limits the prisoners' right to receive packages and gifts and to get food products in the camp store. The law permits wardens to deprive prisoners of the possibility of seeing members of their families. The law forbids the prisoner to possess religious literature (the Bible, hymnals.) The law bans certain topics from prisoners' correspondence, forbids prisoners to receive literature and objective information. One should add to this that in addition to the basic laws, a mass of secret instructions are issued to wardens which direct their daily work. The law enjoins doctors

from declaring a person sick in places of imprisonment in situations in which in ordinary life he would have been declared ill. There is a special list of diagnoses according to which the doctor is forbidden to exempt the prisoner from work or to classify him or her as an invalid. Even prisoners who are classified as second group invalids, incapable of work, are ordered to work. This direct Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) order is to evaluate the biological needs of the prisoner's organism by special, and lower, standards than those of a person at liberty.

Armed with this legal basis, KGB or MVD wardens calmly rule with unlimited arbitrariness, relying on the fact that it is impossible for prisoner's relatives and the public to get information about him. People waste away for months in solitary confinement or in punishment isolation, for several months in a row they are deprived of their right to buy food products in the camp store, for three or four years they are not allowed to see their children, wives, mothers -- and they are also forbidden to conduct a correspondence with them. KGB doctors, who treat prisoners, are ordered to give them medical assistance in accordance with the degree to which their behavior continues to remain "anti-Soviet." Prisoners who are in solitary confinement are told straight out: "Here we cannot provide you with the medical assistance which is necessary -- you should not have ended up in here." Towards prisoners who are on protest hungerstrikes, doctors under KGB orders openly adopt the "cruel approach" tactic, following a single purpose -- to end the fast, to force the hungerstriker to give up his declared demands. This tactic of physical and psychological tortures, is adopted by those under orders towards the fasting prisoner during the process of forced feeding, during the application of large dozes of neuroleptics and of substances which have an adverse effect on the heart-respiratory system. As a result of such tactics, Juri Kukk, Vasyl Stus, Mark Morozov, and Anatoly Marchenko died during or shortly after their hungerstrikes.

The situation of dissidents in special psychiatric hospitals differs from that of prisoners in concentration camps and prisons in that they are even more isolated, and therefore have less rights and are more defenseless. They experience inconceivable suffering from the use of neuroleptics and other medical preparations. There have also been fatalities (Aleksei Nikitin, Valentin Sokolov.)

Reports of acts of brutality against prisoners of conscience in Soviet concentration camps, prisons and special psychiatric hospitals have reached the West in large enough numbers, but for the indignant Western public opinion Soviet politicos have invented concepts of their own understanding of

the essence of civil rights and freedoms and of "non-interference in internal affairs." At each conference to examine fulfillment of the Helsinki agreements, Soviet representatives avoiding answering the charges raised against them by referring to the unemployment and homelessness problems in the West as a blatant violation of rights and freedoms. As if it were possible to put people's tortures and deaths on an equal footing with societal difficulties. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union always manages to get the concluding document adopted. At the Madrid meeting, the Soviet delegation managed to realize its intention and to isolate the issue of humanitarian problems from discussion of the problems of military security. It managed to dismember the entire process of discussion of the totality of Helsinki issues into three parts -- by place and by time. In Stockholm, where it was advantageous for the Soviet representatives to adopt propaganda positions, they were ready to sit for eternity, while in Ottawa all the discussions on a theme which was unpleasant for them led to a two-week verbal skirmish.

During the interval from the Madrid meeting until the Vienna meeting, Article 188 was introduced into the Soviet criminal code, allowing the administration, at its own whim, to hold a person in imprisonment without limits. They managed to re-try some prisoners of conscience in camp and prison, some under this new article. During these years, some well known prisoners of conscience died in imprisonment. An instruction was issued, according to which the hungerstriker was classified as a violator of camp regulations and could be put in solitary confinement for fasting.

At present, as a result of Politburo handouts everywhere people are talking about "restructuring" in the Soviet Union. Characteristically, Soviet leaders themselves prefer to discuss the so-called "democratization" planned by them, but not about the liberalization of the regime. It is becoming clear why until now the criminal code has not been reviewed, why Articles 70 (Ed: "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") and 190-1 (Ed: "anti-Soviet slander") which contravene the Soviet Constitution have not been removed, why some victims of political terror were released as criminals with the formulation of "pardoned," why until now many prisoners still languish behind bars, why they continue to cripple with neuroleptic drugs those who have been interred in psychiatric hospitals for their beliefs, why they do not allow those who have been trying to get exit visas for many years to leave the country, why they deny basic rights to Soviet believers, etc.

The Soviet authorities, evidently, are not interested in significant changes in the area of human rights in the country and have no intention of making them. They have only changed their tactics. The aggressive defense of their past shameless acts has been replaced by false expressions of understanding of problems and by diffuse promises to do something in the future. But until now, political prisoners continue as formerly to sit behind bars for the same reasons and under the same articles of the criminal code, in the same concentration camps, prisons and psychiatric hospitals. And not long ago in the Chelyabinsk psychiatric hospital prisoner of conscience Nizametdin Akhmetov was brutally beaten. The GULAG and the "nuthouses" function. What kind of human rights exist here?

Dr. KORYAGIN. (Statement in Russian language)

Ms. COSMAN. The Helsinki process was planned as a long-term political strategy, developed by the participating States in the Final Act. The participating States planned this strategy to lower the level of military danger in the world by improving relations, and by improving and increasing trust among the participating States.

What can one say now about this process, now that 12 years of the process have gone by?

Cooperation in the humanitarian fields within the Helsinki framework was never a desired goal for the Soviet Union. It was forced to agree to these conditions in order to get what it wanted in the other two baskets. As events have shown, the Soviet Union has never intended to fulfill the points required under the humanitarian sections of the Final Act.

The groups which arose inside the Soviet Union to monitor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet authorities saw as a summons from free Soviet society. The Soviet authorities never feared sanctions by its other partners in the Final Act, and therefore they took reprisals against the members of these groups, putting them behind bars.

Arising in response to psychiatric problems and the violations of psychiatric rights in the Soviet Union, the Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes was thoroughly destroyed by the Soviet authorities in 1980 and 1981, when all the members of this group were imprisoned. I was a doctor and consultant to this Commission, and for doing so I received a 7-year camp sentence and a 5-year exile sentence.

There, inside the cannibalist Gulag, I first really understood the essence of the Soviet legal system. In the concentration camps and in prison the Soviet citizen is not only denied rights, but usually is deprived of his or her health and sometimes even his or her life. Soviet prisoners of conscience are given particularly bad treatment which the KGB achieves by any method and at any price, because it wants to break those people and to force them to deny and renounce their own beliefs.

Even if one looks at Soviet laws, which proclaim the limited rights for the political prisoner and establish forced labor for prisoners, one can see what I have just said. Together with these laws, the prisoner is limited in the possibility of satisfying basic physiological demands, needs. These types of punishments—such punishments as the punishment isolation cell and solitary confinement—due to their poor conditions are regulated by law. The person who is confined in these punishment isolation cells must live through these conditions as torture. And often the conditions in these punishment isolation cells lead to severe illnesses for the prisoner.

There have even been instances in which political prisoners have died in such cells. For example, Armenian prisoner Mrktchian and Ukrainian activist, V. Stus. Soviet law directly provides for limiting or denying the possibility of an adequate diet, or of any diet at all, insofar as it foresees limiting the prisoner's right to receive packages and presents from visitors, and also limits their right to buy food products in prison stores.

The law allows the wardens to deny prisoners their elementary rights—the possibility of seeing his family members. The law does not allow the prisoner to have religious literature, including Bibles and prayer books. The law forbids certain topics and in other ways limits correspondence, receiving literature and getting any kind of objective information.

In addition to these basic laws, the wardens are directed by many secret instructions which direct their daily practice. The law also regulates the practice of doctors in places of imprisonment, not to allow him in certain circumstances to declare someone ill, although in other circumstances he certainly would have been declared ill.

There is a special list of diagnoses for doctors, which do not allow him to exempt a prisoner from work, or to classify him an invalid—even invalids of the second category officially declared incapable of work—are nevertheless supposed to work. This direct order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Medical Department therefore declares that the biological demands of a prisoner's organism are less, than the person who is free.

Armed with this legal justification wardens from the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs can easily rule in an arbitrary fashion, manipulating the impossibility for relatives to see the prisoners and particularly to receive information about prisoners. People waste away for months in punishment isolation cells and are denied for months the right to buy any food in the camp or prison shops. Also, prisoners may be denied the right to see their families, children, mothers, wives for as long as 3 or 4 years. And in addition, during that time, they also cannot receive letters from their families.

By the doctor's order, the prisoner is forced to receive medical help depending on whether his behavior is considered to be anti-Soviet.

When the prisoner is in the punishment isolation cell, wardens tell him directly "Here we can't give you the kind of medical help which you need, but you shouldn't have gotten in the punishment isolation cell in the first place." For prisoners who are engaged in hunger strikes, the doctors, acting on KGB orders, openly adopt a cruel tactic which follows one aim, to bring about the end of the hunger strike, to force the prisoner, the fasting prisoner, to renounce the aims of the fast.

This tactic of physical and psychological torture is also adopted during forced feeding when large doses of neuroleptics are administered which have an adverse effect on the heart and lung system. As a result of these tactics, four prisoners have died during their fasts, or immediately after them: Yuri Kukk, Vasil Stus, Marc Morozov and Anatoly Marchenko.

During the time period from Madrid to Vienna, the Soviet Government passed a new law, namely article 188 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, allowing the administration, according to its own dictates, to hold a person in detention for an unlimited period. Some prisoners of conscience were sentenced in camp and prison, already more than once, some of them under this new article.

In recent years, several well-known human rights activists have died in camp. Instructions were also given according to which the

person who was fasting was considered to be violating the camp or prison regime, and therefore was punished by being thrown into the punishment isolation cell while on hunger strike.

At present the Soviet Politburo is loudly proclaiming the restructuring going on in the Soviet Union. It is characteristic that Soviet leaders would rather talk about the so-called democratization which they plan, but not about liberalization of the regime.

One can understand why the Criminal Code still has not been reexamined, why article 70, namely anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and article 190, anti-Soviet slander—both of which contradict the Soviet Constitution—still are part of the Soviet Criminal Code; why certain victims of the political terror have been released, but as criminals who are required to ask for a pardon, why until now many prisoners of conscience still waste away in imprisonment, why those who have been put in psychiatric hospitals for their beliefs are still crippled by being given neuroleptics, why they still do not allow those to leave the country who have been trying to emigrate for a long time, and why they do not grant basic rights to Soviet believers, et cetera.

In conclusion, the Soviet authorities evidently are not interested in bringing to life changes in the area of human rights in our country, and do not intend to do so. They have merely changed their tactics, the aggressive defense of their cruel actions which they adopted in the past, has been replaced by a false expression of understanding of problems and by promises that something will be done in the future. But political prisoners are, as formerly, imprisoned in the same places, under the same articles, in the same camps, prisons and psychiatric hospitals.

And very recently in the Chernyakhovsk Psychiatric Hospital, prisoner of conscience Nizametdin Akhmetov was very cruelly beaten up by the wardens.

So the Gulag and the psychiatric hospitals continue to function. How can one call these human rights?

Chairman HOYER. I want to thank Cathy Cosman who just saw that testimony in Russian some minutes ago—literally—for so ably conveying Dr. Koryagin's testimony.

I have a number of questions, but will only ask a few and then I will recognize Senator Reid.

First of all, Doctor, what is your estimate of the number of Soviet prisoners of conscience currently in psychiatric hospitals?

Dr. KORYAGIN. It is difficult to say what the total of Soviet psychiatric prisoners is. But of course there are many more than we know, and unfortunately there are some whom we have overlooked. At the end of last year we counted 183, but it is very difficult to compile such statistics because the Soviet authorities try, by every method possible, to prevent such compilations.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, you mentioned this in your statement—but could you describe for us more in detail the procedures which the Soviets utilize for admitting dissidents, refuseniks, political prisoners to psychiatric hospitals?

For example, what is the criteria for deciding whether a person is imprisoned in a labor camp or in a psychiatric hospital?

Dr. KORYAGIN. It is extremely difficult to answer because, sometimes, as one can see with my friend to the right, Alexander Sha-

travka, they will put the same person once in the psychiatric hospital and another time in camp. They have their own laws and calculations, sometimes the decision is made at the level of the regional, or oblast KGB, but sometimes on the republic level.

The authorities use varied criteria in establishing that someone might be a candidate for psychiatric imprisonment. If they, for example, acted strangely at work. Or, if at one point or another, for one reason or another, went to a psychiatrist.

Chairman HOYER. A follow-up on that, is it your impression, therefore, that the difference is that they have some basis on which to claim there has been some behavior which would evidence some mental disorder?

In other words, what I am trying to get at is do they try to have some color of justification for the determination to commit to a psychiatric hospital, as opposed to simply committing to prison or labor camp?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Of course, one must assume that the authorities would like to have certain symptoms to which they could refer. But remember the cases of Vladimir Bukovsky and General Petro Grigorenko, Yuri Belov and Natalya Gorbanevskaya, and others who showed no signs at all, no symptoms of anything one could possibly interpret as mental illness. Nevertheless, they were all put in psychiatric hospitals.

But certainly if there is any circumstance which would lend credence, or would ease their task, they are very quick to turn to that possibility.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, can you give us an estimate of how many psychiatric hospitals and psychiatrists in the Soviet Union are involved in psychiatric abuse? That will be a difficult estimate, I suppose, to make, but how widespread is the abuse of psychiatry, is what we are really trying to get at.

Dr. KORYAGIN. In 1977, there were 11 special psychiatric hospitals, today there are 16.

Ms. COSMAN. I should add an editor's note, special psychiatric hospitals are run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they are prison-style psychiatric hospitals.

Of course a number of psychiatric patients who are there because they are an actual danger to society, that number has risen.

Nevertheless, in each one of these hospitals you can also find prisoners of conscience. All the medical personnel that run these special psychiatric hospitals are officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and their primary loyalty is to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, only secondarily as doctors. And of course any one of these doctors, if so instructed, will carryout repressive actions against prisoners, if required.

In ordinary psychiatric hospitals, ordinary doctors also will carryout repressive actions against prisoners of conscience, but not as a rule. Therefore, to carryout such policies, such actions, special doctors are chosen for that.

The KGB keeps dossiers and files on every doctor working in ordinary psychiatric hospitals for this reason. And therefore when they decide to detain a prisoner of conscience in an ordinary psychiatric hospital, the KGB consults with the administration of that hospital, to decide which doctor on the staff would be best, from

their point of view, to work over the patient, according to what they desire to achieve.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, could you perhaps place in context for me the number of 16? I realize that you may not be able to give me a precise number, but approximately how many psychiatric hospitals are there that is, 16 of how many?

Dr. KORYAGIN. It is very difficult for me to answer that for the simple reason that for the last 6 years, due to the charges brought against me and the conditions of my incarceration, I have been deprived of and totally cutoff from my profession. Therefore, I could not really give you a precise statistic. But, nevertheless, the statistics should be available in official statistics provided by the Soviet Government to give an overall profile of the number of hospitals.

Certainly several hundred.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Doctor, I have some other questions but, I am going to recognize Senator Reid.

Mr. REID. During the translation of the statement of Mr. Shatravka I heard a statement that one of the times he got in trouble was because he had long hair.

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Well, that was a long time ago, but that is what started my whole story.

Mr. REID. I have a boy at home like that.

Mr. SHATRAVKA. But in the Soviet Union when you refuse to cut your hair it is viewed as resisting the authorities, it is a much more serious crime.

Mr. REID. Doctor, in the Soviet Union is your medical training similar to that in Europe and the United States?

Dr. KORYAGIN. The psychiatrists in the Soviet Union finish the medical institute and after that choose a medical specialty. I finished the medical institute and then decided to become a psychiatrist and began to study. After I was trained as a psychiatrist, I then worked in my specialty, in practice, and then I returned to an institute to get a more advanced degree as a psychiatrist, getting my candidate degree writing my thesis on schizophrenia.

The Soviet authorities, after I was sentenced, took special measures before a special commission which studies such questions, and took away my candidate degree.

Mr. REID. Dr. Koryagin is a medical doctor?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Of course.

Mr. REID. And when he said graduate from a medical institute, that is like graduating from a medical school in Europe or here, the same thing?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Yes, and I got a medical degree as a medical doctor.

Mr. REID. How were you chosen to go into psychiatry, was that something that you chose, or was it competitive exams? How were you able to go into the field of psychiatry?

Dr. KORYAGIN. I, myself, decided and chose the field of psychiatry, according to my own wishes.

Mr. REID. There was a lot in your statement that was read to us, translated for us—there was a lot of talk about something called neuroleptics, would you explain what that is?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Neuroleptics are a substance which has a strongly activizing effect on the nervous system.

Mr. REID. Would it be something like LSD, mind-expanding drugs that we hear so much about here?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Neuroleptics are used in treatment of various psychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia. Neuroleptics are very widely used in medicine. They can lead to hallucinations, delirium, can bring about delirium. Primarily, neuroleptics can also produce a wide range of side effects which are very, very difficult for the patient to live through—not live through in the sense of life and death, but just very difficult.

Mr. REID. Doctor, do you know of any examples, and I certainly don't need any names, but do you know of examples of people who have been placed in these medical facilities, who have been reduced to insanity?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Yes, I know instances in which this has happened.

Mr. REID. Dr. Koryagin, why do you feel that the Government of the Soviet Union let you out of the hospital and let you leave the Soviet Union?

Dr. KORYAGIN. I was released from camp because the Soviet authorities decided to release a certain number of prisoners from camp, in general.

Mr. REID. But why?

Dr. KORYAGIN. To let some steam out of the kettle, so it wouldn't explode. And also, of course, to release those who were best known in the West and therefore caused them the most trouble. Because of certain political prisoners' relations with the West had deteriorated. Now Soviet leaders have decided they want to improve relations with the West.

And I was released to the West for the simple reason that when I was in prison I told the wardens that as soon as I got out—the very next day—I would resume my old activities. And, therefore, they wanted me out of the country. And, in fact, that is what I did. As soon as I got out of camp, the very next day, I issued some statements which were widely distributed and continue to do so.

Mr. REID. But that's my whole point, why didn't they let somebody else out, why him, that talks so much and had the reputation that he does?

Dr. KORYAGIN. The person who sits quietly is no great danger to the Soviet authorities. And therefore, they are not opposed to keeping him sitting there quietly all the time. The person, however, who sits there and makes noise, makes things very uncomfortable for them, therefore, they want to have that person leave the country and get rid of that irritant.

And in this connection I want to emphasize that it is extremely helpful for Soviet political prisoners when the West speaks out on their behalf.

Mr. REID. Dr. Koryagin, did you suffer any—have you suffered any permanent injury, either physically or emotionally as a result of your being placed in one of these facilities?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Yes, I understand what you mean, I want to say that when a political prisoner is in camp, or prison, he is subjected to continual and massive efforts by the authorities to get him to change his mind, change his convictions. And of course, among these methods adopted by the authorities are physical and moral

pressures. All these measures are adopted against any individual, against specific individuals in a very calculated way, according to a well-worked out pattern. The same happened to me.

Mr. REID. How did the people you went to school with, the people who practiced psychiatry with, how do they feel about the fact that you were placed in an institution yourself?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Those people who knew me had different attitudes towards my imprisonment. I mean some of my colleagues, my fellow doctors and psychiatrists, continued their contacts with my family, and wrote to my wife. Others dropped all connections and contacts with my family. People are different.

Mr. REID. What are the most common ailments that a psychiatrist treats of those people who come to them for mental care in the Soviet Union, not in the prison-type facility, but in the regular mental institutions?

What I am saying why do we need psychiatrists in the Soviet Union?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Well, psychiatrists are needed in the Soviet Union, just as in any other country because people have psychiatric illnesses. If you are interested in the profile of psychiatric illnesses in the Soviet Union, I should say that the first place currently is held by those suffering from drug and alcohol addiction. Neuroses of various kinds are on the increase, but also schizophrenia, those two types of illnesses are probably next in line.

Mr. REID. Mr. Shatravka, could you describe for us a day in a Soviet—daily life of a patient in a Soviet psychiatric hospital?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Well, they get you up early in the morning, the orderlies who get people up from bed are criminals themselves who have fairly light criminal labor camp sentences and work as orderlies. The ill patients, who are usually under the strong influence of neuroleptics or other drugs, are really in no condition even to get up from bed, and if they are sluggish about getting up, the orderlies sometimes prod them with keys or with sticks, bunches of keys—they sometimes hit them.

There are usually 80 people in each ward, and they usually only give you 20 minutes to wash and get ready. Then they drive everybody back into the ward and they await breakfast. Then they take everybody to breakfast and they force them all to wash their hands with chlorine, which is very harsh, and the food is just terrible, dreadful food.

And then of course after that there is administering medication, and by the way, the doses are very heavy. Then cleanup of the facility starts and they put everyone to work.

Then once again they take you to the toilet before lunch, and then lunch. They are driven into the cafeteria and they are once again administered heavy doses of medication. Then people are taken out into what is called the exercise yard for 1 hour, sometimes 30 to 40 minutes. The exercise yard—I am using that term, but really it is just a sort of small little space—it is filthy, it is not really a place to exercise in.

I have been in three different psychiatric hospitals and I am describing you the routine at Dnepropetrovsk. The routine varies from one hospital to another.

After the exercise they spend the rest of the day in their wards, then they are taken to dinner, and once again dosed and medicated. After such poor food, malnutrition—after such heavy doses of medication and the lack of exercise and activity, people really become very ugly and withdrawn, pale and in very bad physical health. And if they came into the facility sane and normal and healthy, by the time they have spent a while there, they become ill and not only physically ill, but mentally ill.

But what I am describing is not true of all psychiatric hospitals in the Soviet Union, it is true of only the ones that I saw, the special psychiatric hospitals.

Mr. REID. What happened to his brother in the psychiatric hospital?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Well, when we were put in the Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital, we were kept together even in the same ward for 2 years. And during that period we did not receive medication. The doctor who was in that particular facility saw that we were not mentally ill and that we didn't require any of the heavy medication, during those 2 years.

As a result of being held in the psychiatric hospital, and what had happened when we were captured in Finland, my brother had a nervous breakdown from the stress.

Mr. REID. Where is he now?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. He is now in a psychiatric hospital in the Ukraine.

Mr. REID. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, going back to you, sir. Senator Reid asked a couple of questions with respect to psychiatry and your training in the Soviet Union. Can you tell us whether, from your perspective, there is a difference in the underlying theoretical and philosophical basis of Soviet psychiatry and that of the West?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Yes, of course there are major differences in certain interpretations of theoretical questions in Soviet versus Western, American and European, psychiatry. There are differences in diagnoses, in medical treatment, and methods of treatment and examination.

When I examined those patients who came to me, those who had been victims of psychiatric terror, I conducted those examinations according to methods of Soviet psychiatry, using Soviet methods of diagnosis. And even according to Soviet standards, methods and criteria, I came to the conclusion that one could only call these people "ill," if one specially set out to do so.

Chairman HOYER. Now, you are referring, I believe to the 17 who had been determined by somebody else to be in need of psychiatric help and then you had the opportunity of seeing those people and determined that that diagnosis was clearly incorrect. There was no doubt in your mind that it was not a case where the 17 had improved, or been healed in someway, but from your observation were not mentally ill in the first place, is that correct?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Yes, I concluded that these people were completely healthy. After all, if this had not been the case, I think Soviet official psychiatry would have made every effort to discredit my analysis.

They would have summoned several professors, setup a commission, called me before that commission, brought in the patients and setout to prove that my diagnosis had been incorrect. They could have easily done so, but they didn't. And it is understandable why.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, in that context, can you tell us the reaction of your colleagues to what you have discussed as being the abuse of psychiatry? What is the general feeling within the profession, what was the general reaction to your activities and your diagnosis?

I understand Soviet authorities did not setup a panel to discredit you on these 17, but generally, what is the reaction of the individual Soviet psychiatrist as it relates to how his, or her profession is being used and abused?

Dr. KORYAGIN. It is very difficult to answer your question because there is so little information for about the entire Soviet population in all areas. Many may have heard about my case—that a Soviet psychiatrist was sentenced—was convicted for protesting the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. Certainly, however, they didn't know any details. Furthermore, most likely this information would have reached them as a distant rumor.

And those who knew me personally reacted in various ways, some said I got mixed up in something that was none of my business. Others said that I had done the right thing. Others said that they would like to do the same thing, but admitted that they simply were not brave enough.

What I am saying here refers to the circle of doctors with whom I had some personal contact. But the broader reaction is much more difficult for me to judge, because I simply have no way of being able to know, in fact, it was.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, let me ask about your particular experiences at the Chistopol Prison.

Dr. KORYAGIN. Chistopol is a prison for political prisoners, and the conditions there are considerably worse than in camp. And the regime is much harsher in all ways. In prison I was under constant massive pressure for 3 years—out of 3 years I was on hunger strikes for 2 years and 1 month.

Chairman HOYER. Now, Doctor, when you say it is particularly harsh, did you have the opportunity to view other prisoners as well, or was your isolation such that you could not see the treatment of the other prisoners?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Yes, I did have the opportunity to have contact with other prisoners, using illegal methods. The better known political prisoners were not allowed to have contact with each other, were never put in the same cell. So, we were forced to find methods of illegal contact, and prisoners of all kinds will always find ways of forming these illegal contacts, no matter what the wardens will do.

And the wardens will always be the most hardened towards those prisoners who refuse to give in and who refuse to renounce their views. This, I believe, is a universal attitude.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, let me ask you now two general questions, if I may. There is much talk of glasnost and perestroika. There appears to be a change in the Soviet Union with respect to information, an opening of cultural activities. One example of that

of course was the fact that your release and authorization to emigrate was included in Soviet newspapers, as I understand it.

Now, obviously you did not have a great deal of time in which to make observations regarding the changes that are occurring in the Soviet Union, but to the extent that your observations allow, I would like to hear of your thoughts with respect to what is going on in the Soviet Union, what it means for the West and whether you think that the changes that are occurring will be broader than we have now seen?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Of course one can't deny that there have been changes in the Soviet Union. But it is another question how one should react to them. And in order to react to them correctly, I think one needs to analyze them, going to the heart of the matter. Why have they adopted these changes? That's the main question.

I think the Soviet Government was forced to adopt these changes because of difficulties, in fact, major difficulties, in the area of the Soviet economy and in the internal life of the country, and certain political difficulties in the international arena. Insofar as Soviet society is seen by Western governments as of the totalitarian type. The Soviet Union wants to draw closer to the West and in order to gain certain economic advantages.

So, in order to do this, one has to create society capable of transformation. Therefore a broad propaganda campaign was adopted, ordered from above and coming from above. Certain real measures were undertaken which, however, do not in anyway bring any harm to the existing basis of the system, but which nevertheless allow the system to appear to be more acceptable. That is why these new changes cannot be seen as partial, or even as half-hearted. They are out of balance and out of proportion. And they don't touch all spheres of Soviet life.

Chairman HOYER. When Dr. Koryagin says that they are out of proportion, I presume what he is saying is that they are very small as related to the violations that exist, is that what he is saying? I just want to make sure I understand this.

In other words, the reforms have been very slight and have not affected the majority of abuses that exist.

Dr. KORYAGIN. Yes, so far they have been very partial and one can't characterize them as having a really major effect. In fact, they are so minor that it is even difficult to feel any results. But nevertheless, it was considered necessary to pull these out of the hat, in order to show that they exist. But if the intentions of the Soviet leadership were honest, sincere, then the liberalization would be on a much wider scale and affecting all areas of life.

For example, not one Soviet leader has said that from now on expression of political views will not be punished, and those political prisoners who were released were forced to sign confessions, were forced to sign requests for pardons, hence, are still seen as criminals.

So in other words to publicly proclaim one's views will still be regarded as criminal. But if one talks about glasnost, about openness, then one should act on that principle in a real way. Of course one can't deny that this process will continue. But I think it will be, of necessity, a forced process and in any case will have limits.

And we will in the future see these limits.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Doctor.

I have other questions, but at this time I want to ask Mr. Shatravka some questions as well.

You have described your daily life in the hospital, were there any psychiatrists whom you met that were sympathetic to your position, and specifically, who expressed the fact that they felt you were in the psychiatric hospital without justification?

You did indicate that for a couple of years you were not administered drugs, and that they determined that you weren't mentally ill. Did any of the psychiatrists express the concern that you shouldn't be in the hospital?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Yes, of course, there were such psychiatrists that were sympathetic, but they themselves were powerless in the positions they were in.

Chairman HOYER. When you say they were powerless, do you know whether they tried to say anything? Did they make representations to the authorities, or to the administrator of the hospital that you weren't sick, mentally ill?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. No, they had their instructions. That's absolutely the way it works.

Chairman HOYER. Now, did they indicate that to you, or is that your presumption, based upon, as you say, that's how the system works?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Well, let me give you an example, when I ended up in the Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital I asked the doctors, "How long am I going to have to be in this hospital?" And they said, "Well, we can probably cure you within the 5-year plan." In other words, within 5 years. That's how I knew how they dealt with these cases as a rule, that most of the people who were incarcerated for trying to cross the border got 5-year terms.

When I was transferred to Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital from Dnepropetrovsk—by that time my name was already well known in the West—my case was raised. My parents began to write their appeals to Soviet agencies and government officials so that my brother and I could be released from the psychiatric hospital.

Then after my parents' appeals, the doctors in Chernyakhovsk then admitted that there would be a very specific term after which we would be released. In my brother's case within a year he would be signed out of the hospital and in my case within half a year.

This is how it works, twice a year a commission of doctors comes from the Serbsky Institute for Forensic Psychiatry, which is located in Moscow. Twice a year they would come around to the regional hospitals and a certain doctor, Dr. Elinsky from this Serbsky Commission was the one who made these statements that I would get out within a half a year, my brother in 1 year.

Let me cite you an example of the careless way they work: they mixed up my brother and I. This Dr. Elinsky was supposed to release my brother, that is what his case said, but what he did was to release me.

Chairman HOYER. As I understand it, the way it works is that twice a year they come around and make an analysis, presumably on a medical basis, but notwithstanding that, in effect what you

are saying is they gave you and your brother a 6-month and a 12-month term, unrelated to any psychiatric finding?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. That's right, the commissions just appear and they work very formally. And one other point, it is not twice a year for that hospital, it is twice a year for that individual patient that his case is reviewed. But it has no relationship to his case and his treatment, per se, it is just a formal procedure.

Chairman HOYER. Now, when you went to Dr. Koryagin, why did you go to Dr. Koryagin?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Well, first of all, I had met people in the Moscow Helsinki Group, and they told me to see Dr. Voloshanovich, who was another independent psychiatric examiner. Then in turn I was referred to Dr. Koryagin, who was also close to the members of the Helsinki Group.

Actually Voloshanovich wasn't a psychiatrist by profession in the way that Koryagin is, although he is also a medical doctor.

Chairman HOYER. And as a result of seeing Dr. Koryagin, who indicated to you that he saw no psychological problem, what happened?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Immediately after I was examined, I was arrested. I was arrested right off the bus on the way from your house. So, we shook hands in the Ukraine last time and now we are shaking hands in Washington.

Chairman HOYER. Welcome.

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. The arrest that occurred on the bus, were you then charged again, immediately, and if so, what was the specific charge?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. There was no formal charge because the 26th Party Congress was going on. They just threw me into the psychiatric hospital for 1½ months, to get me out of the way.

Chairman HOYER. Let me ask you something, Mr. Shatravka, the Soviets have asked in Vienna for a humanitarian concerns conference to be held in Moscow. If they arrested you to apparently get you off the street, at the time of the 26th Party Congress, what is your thought of what they would do if they invited 34 other nations to come to Moscow for a conference on humanitarian concerns?

Dr. Koryagin might want to respond to that question as well.

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Yes, I do believe that they will roundup people during that kind of international meeting. Just last summer when they had the Goodwill Games, they rounded up a good number of people and they ended up in psychiatric detention.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Shatravka, the last question I would ask you, sir, why do you think the Soviets let you go?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Well, they compromised themselves because they arrested and sentenced me for the peace movement, the cause of the struggle for peace. And of course, there was immense international publicity because I am a peace activist, and that enabled me to be released.

Chairman HOYER. In other words, it is your opinion that the publicity and the pressure that was brought to bear resulted in your release?

Mr. SHATRAVKA. Of course.

Chairman HOYER. Now, Dr. Koryagin, if I can ask you a few more questions, and then we will end. I know you have had a long tiring period of time in our country. Yesterday we had a hearing with reference to a gentleman named Miroslav Medvid. Mr. Medvid was the gentleman who was on a Soviet ship on the Mississippi River, who jumped off the ship, dived into the river, swam to shore, did not speak any English and ultimately got to authorities. The officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not really communicate with him and determine specifically what he wanted to do, so he was ultimately returned to the Soviet ship.

Sometime thereafter, the United States authorities boarded the Soviet ship, and found Mr. Medvid in a condition of apparently having been sedated. He was restrained in his bed by towels, apparently wrapped around his arms, his wrists and his ankles. Mr. Ritter, who is a member of this Commission was particularly concerned that I ask you these questions that relate to this.

Now, Mr. Medvid, it is believed by many, as a result of jumping off the ship and by the way, he dove off a second time and swam to shore, had to be physically restrained and returned to the ship. To some of us it appears relatively clear that he was asking for political asylum, but apparently he did not articulate that well enough for our INS officials to follow the procedures they would have followed for a person asking for political asylum.

So the question then became whether he did, in fact, want to ask for political asylum. My questions to you relating to this incident are: are you aware of—I don't have the names of the—I don't know whether the staff has the names of any of the drugs that were used—see if you can find that—there were some drugs that were admittedly given to him on the Soviet ship.

He had obviously been sedated. Our authorities waited for a period of time, then took him off the ship, sometime later interviewed him, at which point in time he indicated that he had decided that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union, to Ukraine.

My question to you is, based upon your experience, do you know what kind of drugs they would have given him? Would those drugs, do you believe, have had the effect of altering his opinion, or being susceptible to suggestion by the captain, or other officers on the ship that, in fact, he really did want to return to the Soviet Union, and would lead him to express that to U.S. authorities, notwithstanding the fact that that might not have been his intent at all?

Dr. KORYAGIN. I think most likely this was some kind of neuroleptic which very noticeably increases mental activity, and alters one's will. So this type of drug could have been given to him in order to decrease activity and probably could have been given with another kind of substance which could have made his emotional state either extremely apathetic, or on the contrary, rather elevated.

As a result, in this case, I think one could say that the person in question could temporarily be in a state that was abnormal, mentally abnormal. And whether or not the Soviet authorities would be capable of using these drugs in such a way, to produce such an effect, I don't have the slightest doubt that they, in fact, would do so.

But to be more specific as to the actual drugs used, is very difficult, especially since I haven't seen the person and particularly since now there is a broad variety of such neuroleptics available. And the question of the combination of the neuroleptic with another substance to produce the desired effect this formula could easily have been developed in a secret Soviet laboratory, of a closed type. It is well known that many pharmacologists in the Soviet Union work in special closed facilities, run by the Ministry of Defense.

Chairman HOYER. Would the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Interior work together regarding the use of these drugs and test them in the special psychiatric hospitals. Which I understand are run by the Ministry of Interior?

Dr. KORYAGIN. Certainly the MVD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB have access to, and use the newest developments in any field of science they consider necessary. After all, the repressive apparatus is the basis of everything else, everything else depends on it. And, therefore, everything is made available for it.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, the last question on the Medvid issue, and my last question, indeed, is how long would it take for a patient to return to full control of his or her faculties, even considering a heavy dose of such neuroleptics?

In other words, how long should the U.S. authorities in this particular case, have waited with Mr. Medvid under their control, in order to assure themselves that his opinion was not affected, one way or the other by the use of these drugs?

Dr. KORYAGIN. It is hard to say specifically because these drugs could have widely varying effects. For example, there are certain neuroleptics with especially prolonged effects which can last even up to several weeks. The only real way to tell when he came to himself, and returned to a normal state of mind, would have been to have him under observation. Any capable psychiatrist would have known when, in fact, that occurred, when he returned to normal.

Ms. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Shatravka would like to add one comment to the Medvid case. As a person who himself escaped from the Soviet Union, I can understand the psychological state of the young sailor, as a person who fled from the Soviet Union, only to land into the hands of the Finnish authorities and be returned back to Soviet custody. I can understand that the sailor Medvid would no doubt have had great fear and doubt about the way the American authorities would handle him, since they had returned him in the first instance. And during the second meeting with those American authorities, he may have been so fearful of what would happen to him, that he would, indeed, prefer to go back to the Soviet Union.

Chairman HOYER. I think that is a very profound point that Mr. Shatravka makes. And I am pleased that he intervened to offer that, because I think that is a very important element as to what might have happened with Mr. Medvid the second time around, given the fact that he was returned twice.

So I think that is a very useful observation.

Mr. Shatravka and Dr. Koryagin, on behalf of not only the Helsinki Commission but on behalf of all of the Congress, I want to thank you for taking the time to be with us and to offer the infor-

mation to us. It has been very useful and your insights are so important for us to have to make sound decisions.

In addition, I want to thank both of you because I think you have highlighted a message which Mr. Shcharansky, Mr. Orlov, and others have given to us previously. That is, in the words of Dr. Koryagin, it is extremely helpful for people of the West to speak out.

Mr. Shatravka made the same point, that he was well known in the West, and that is why he believes the Soviet authorities took action.

As I said to Mr. Shcharansky when he testified before us, and others who have testified, it is a great privilege for us to have the testimony of individuals who have shown such great courage, not only on behalf of their rights, but on behalf of the rights of their fellow citizens and mankind. It is clearly through efforts like yours that serve as an inspiration to peoples who are oppressed and people who seek to help those who are oppressed.

So, I want to thank both of you on behalf of the Congress and on behalf of the Commission for being with us. I assure you that we will not stop our efforts to publicize and to urge the media and other Members of Congress, the President and all of the representatives in the Helsinki process to speak out strongly and continually against human rights abuses. The Commission intends to ensure that the efforts you have undertaken are aided and abetted by those who have not been in such jeopardy as you have been, who have not paid the price that you have paid for speaking out.

So thank you very much, and we look forward to working with you in the future.

Thank you.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 1:00 p.m.]

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